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Abstract: In passing remarks, some commentators have noted that 
for Nagel, physicalism is true. It has even been argued that Nagel 
seeks to find the best path to follow to achieve future physicalism. I 
advance these observations by adding that for Nagel, we should dis-
cuss the consciousness problem not in terms of physical and mental 
issues but in terms of our desire to include consciousness in an objec-
tive/scientific account, and we can achieve this only by revising our 
self-conception, i.e., folk psychology, to develop a more detached view 
of experience. Through the project of objective phenomenology, Nagel 
aims to achieve some sort of objective, detached, and scientific ex-
planation of the subjective nature of experience. This project seeks 
to make the truth of physicalism intelligible and consciousness more 
amenable to scientific study, potentially raising an even broader con-
cept than the one physicalism originally proposes.  
Keywords: Folk psychology; Nagel; objective phenomenology; physi-
calism; science of consciousness. 
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1. Introduction  
“[P]hysicalism … repels me although I am persuaded  
of its truth.” (Nagel 1965, 356) 
 Thomas Nagel has been claimed (i) to argue against physicalism (e.g., 
Thomas 2009; Sundström 2002), (ii) to have changed his position from 
physicalism to nonphysicalism and later to anti-physicalism from 1965 to 
1998 (e.g., Nagasawa 2003, 377; cf. Foss 1993, 726) or from 1986 to 2012 
(Seager 2014, 10, n12), and (iii) to deny the possibility of giving an objective 
account of consciousness (e.g., Dennett 1991, 71; Bond 2005, 129–30; 
McHenry and Shields 2016, 497).1 Some commentators have noted that 
Nagel does not in fact claim that physicalism is false (D’Oro 2007, 170). 
For example, Seager asserts that  
Nagel is officially agnostic about the truth of physicalism, or even 
leans towards accepting it, but takes it for granted that absent a 
plausible route towards establishing reductive epistemological de-
pendence, arguments in favour of a physicalist solution to the 
mind-body problem are just ‘sidestepping it’. (Seager 2014, 10) 
 In an associated note (n12) on the same page, he adds that “At least, 
that was true at the time Nagel wrote the famous bat paper and in Nagel 
(1986); he seems to have definitively rejected physicalism in his latest work, 
Nagel (2012).” As he says, it is also possible to think of Nagel as leaning 
toward accepting physicalism. 
 On rare occasions, it has been acknowledged that he tends to believe 
that physicalism is true but is still suspicious of its sufficiency. Tim Crane 
observed that “Nagel’s view was that physicalism is true, but that we can-
not fully understand it” (2007, 23). More importantly, Stubenberg argues 
that Nagel wants to clear the path for a future physicalism (see his 1998). 
I further their observation by adding that for Nagel we should discuss the 
consciousness problem not in physical and mental terms but from our desire 
to include consciousness in an objective/scientific account and that we can 
achieve this only by revising our self-conception, i.e., folk psychology, to 
develop a more detached view of experience. 
                                                 
1  See section 3 for many other references.  
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 Through the project of objective phenomenology, Nagel aims to achieve 
some sort of objective, detached, and scientific explanation of the subjective 
aspect of experience (1986, chaps. 1–2, see also 1974, 449). The project 
intends to make the truth of physicalism intelligible and consciousness more 
amenable to scientific study.  
 This article places Thomas Nagel’s ideas regarding physicalism in the 
context of his proposal for objective phenomenology. In fact, a detailed dis-
cussion of the objective phenomenology project provides the basis for 
Nagel’s lesser known critique of folk psychology. Unfortunately, a large ma-
jority of the literature on the philosophy of mind focused on Nagel is silent 
with respect to his austere criticisms of the deficiencies of our self-concep-
tion.2 Once we understand this triangular relationship, it is much easier to 
understand that embracing physicalism is quite compatible with Nagel’s 
general framework. Though Nagel has said that “consciousness is what 
makes the mind–body problem really intractable” (1974, 435), the objective 
phenomenology project is meant to make it tractable within a physicalist 
framework. It is true that consciousness is obstinate to an objective charac-
terization, but it is not impossible to remove its resistance if we sufficiently 
revise our current framework of folk psychology (Nagel 1993, 2002). Let me 
start by providing initial definitions for consciousness and folk psychology 
before discussing the relationships between them.  
 Whatever else consciousness is, it is typically presented as something 
unitary, accessible to the privileged first-person view, intentional, and qual-
itative. Folk psychology is, roughly, the framework underlying generaliza-
tions made by lay people to understand and predict the behaviors of other 
people and their own behaviors. It also reflects the familiar conception of 
mind that ordinary people endorse, and this conception infiltrates the usual 
language of philosophers of mind when they talk about consciousness. 
Through this envisaged revision in folk psychology, physicalism’s seeming 
wanting disappears, as our standards to judge the soundness of any  
physicalist theory will change. Thus, physicalism lives up to our expecta-
tions. The naïve preconception of the mind and body is restructured. The 
                                                 
2  Nagel uses the terms “folk psychology,” “our self-conception,” “standard menta-
listic idioms,” and “traditional conception of mind” interchangeably. This is not a 
problem of content, but it might be confusing for readers. 
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ossified conception of the mind fails to adapt to new knowledge that we 
have gained about the deficiencies of our self-conception and is likely to be 
significantly updated and may die out (see Nagel 1998). We shall discuss 
these points in the following sections. 
2. Nagel embraces physicalism 
“I am inclined to believe that some weak physicalist theory  
of the third type is true ...” (1965, p. 340) 
 Physicalism is one of the most protean terms developed in recent phi-
losophy. There are thousands of philosophers who are physicalist from one 
point of view, but anti-physicalist from another. For some, physicalism sug-
gests that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. More accurately, “if 
physicalism is true, phenomenal consciousness must be an illusion” 
(Tartaglia 2016, 236). For others, we can and should be realists about our 
experiences but also physicalists of some sort. For instance, Nagel describes 
Galen Strawson as a materialist of an anti-reductionist type and a realist 
about experience: 
However, Strawson is a materialist and does not think that your 
self could exist apart from your central nervous system. He holds 
that your experiences are events in your brain, and that if there 
is a self which is their subject it too must be in the brain. But he 
is a materialist of an unusual kind: a realist about experience and 
an anti-reductionist. (Nagel 2009) 
 Strawson is a realist about experience and an anti-reductionist on the 
mind–body problem as Nagel is. Despite this, Nagel says that Strawson is 
an unusual kind of materialist. According to this line of reasoning, Nagel 
should call himself a physicalist. This is not unexpected, since contrary to 
what so many philosophers believe, Thomas Nagel tends to believe that a 
weaker form of physicalism is true (1965, 340&356). Strong physicalism rep-
resents a type identity theory for him. The right alternative is some sort of 
token physicalism. This reflects a strong version of token materialism and 
is occasionally referred to as neutral monism or dual-aspect theory (or even 
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pansychism once upon a time) by him (2012, 4–5; cf. Pernu 2017, 6).3 For 
him, the mental is strictly dependent on the physical: 
The mind-brain case seems a natural candidate for such treat-
ment because what happens in consciousness is pretty clearly su-
pervenient on what happens physically in the brain. In the pre-
sent state of our conceptions of consciousness and neurophysiol-
ogy, this strict dependence is a brute fact and completely myste-
rious. (Nagel 2002, 207) 
 Nagel says that “Materialism is the currently dominant form of reduc-
tionism, and it reduces the mental to the physical via the reduction of the 
mental to the biological” (Nagel et al. 2016, 394). When he uses the word 
materialism as shorthand for “reductive physicalism” or for specific forms 
of “naturalism,” he rejects it. He dismisses them on the grounds that they 
leave something important about consciousness unexplained. He sometimes 
claims that mentalistic concepts are indispensable (see, e.g., 2016, 400) and 
at other times seriously entertains the idea that all of our mentalistic con-
cepts with all the principles of our self-conception will not survive the next 
century intact (1998).  
 This bring us to a difficult question: is physicalism true for Nagel or 
not? He sometimes argues that mentalistic language is indispensable but at 
other times contends that physicalism must be true. Some philosophers see 
an equivocation between the two notions of physicalism illustrated in 
Nagel’s publications, as Torin Alter notes (but mistakenly rejects): 
There are other ways to interpret Nagel’s view in WLBB [1974] 
about the status of physicalism. For example, one possibility is that 
he equivocates on “physicalism”: in some places he uses the term 
to refer to certain reductionist theories that he outright rejects, and 
in others he uses it to refer to physicalist theories that he believes 
are compatible with S and possibly true.4 (Alter 2002, 155, n11) 
                                                 
3  McGinn noted that “Something close to anomalous monism is tentatively en-
dorsed by Thomas Nagel in ‘Physicalism’” (1980, 202, n3).  
4  S denotes the general principle that “Experiences are subjective: understanding 
their true nature requires having or imaginatively adopting the viewpoint of the 
experiencing creature” (2002, 147). 
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 By blurring the distinctions between materialism as such, reductive 
physicalism, and naturalism, Nagel causes considerable confusion for his 
readers. We must first remedy this confusion. We will start with physical-
ism, continue with objectivity, and end with folk psychology. My argument, 
as a first approximation, can be summarized as follows. Due to conspicuous 
deficiencies of folk psychology, i.e., our self-conception, it is difficult for us 
to imagine that mental states are physical states and that physicalism is 
true. The objective phenomenology project offers the capacity to make this 
truth intelligible.  
 Nagel tries to teach us to think of physicalism problem in terms of the 
objective–subjective relationship. This relationship is not a polarized one 
but shows gradation. Moreover, the two sides of the relation are parts of a 
continuum (see section 3). We have evidence that physicalism is true, but 
we do not know how and why it is true: “… I think we also have some reason 
to believe that sensations are physical processes, without being in a position 
to understand how” (1974, 448). We do not fully know its nature. What he 
argues against are certain sorts of physicalism as follows: scientistic, reduc-
tionist, and functionalist ones (Nagel 2002). He levels charge against these 
versions of physicalism; an approach based upon common sense, assuming 
the possibility of logical reductionism, granting the correctness of our self-
conception, rather than explaining subjective aspects of experience ignoring 
it (Nagel 1965, 1970).  
 The point for Nagel, as stated above, is not physicalism as such but the 
objectivity problem: 
We cannot genuinely understand the hypothesis that their nature 
is captured in a physical description unless we understand the 
more fundamental idea that they have an objective nature (or 
that objective processes can have a subjective nature). (1974, 
448) (Italics original) 
 In the debate over consciousness, Nagel should be regarded as a nonsub-
jectivist: “My aim is to clarify and explore this question and to try, for 
certain domains of thought, to defend what I shall call a rationalist answer 
against what I shall call a subjectivist one” (1997, 3). Nagel stipulates that 
if something is physical, then it must be objective (1974, 449, fn 15). In 
addition, he, in his 1965 article entitled “Physicalism,” explicitly states that 
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a weaker form of physicalism is likely to be true. However, it would be 
better, he argues in “What is It Like to Be a Bat?” (1974) and “Conceiving 
the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem” (1998), to conceptually revise 
our mentalistic ideas. Hence, we should see him as a revisionary materialist 
(cf. Allen-Hermanson 2015, 59–63; cf. Bickle 1992, 1998, chap. 6; cf. 
Sundström 2018).  
 Let us proceed to see what the problem is with folk psychology. Below 
is Nagel’s surprisingly harsh criticism of it based on the fact that our men-
talistic ideas have naturally evolved through nonscientific functions. He 
then goes on saying that: 
Our dealings with and declarations to one another require a spe-
cialized vocabulary, and although it serves us moderately well in 
ordinary life, its narrowness and inadequacy as a psychological 
theory become evident when we attempt to apply it in the for-
mulation of general descriptions of human behavior or in the ex-
planation of abnormal mental conditions. (1970, 399; for similar 
reasons, see, e.g., P. S. Churchland 1986, 223) (Italics added) 
 From this it follows that our mentalist picture is insufficient for a gen-
eral account of human behavior and cognition, though it is enough for daily 
transactions. However, we should desire a sufficient account. Then, the 
mentalist picture should be improved by unending revisions for the follow-
ing reason: 
The crude and incomplete causal theory embodied in com-
monsense psychology should not be expected to survive the next 
hundred years of central nervous system studies intact. It would 
be surprising if concepts like belief and desire found correspond-
ents in a neurophysiological theory, considering how limited their 
explanatory and predictive power is, even for gross behavior. 
(1970, 399) (Italics added) 
 This passage reflects explicitly a powerful critique of folk psychology 
focusing on concepts of belief and desire. It emphasizes the explanatory 
limitations and predictive weaknesses of folk psychology regarding even 
gross behavior. It claims that future brain science would not match our 
current self-conception.  
8  Serdal Tümkaya 
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The physical behavior which, on Armstrong's analysis, a given 
intention is apt to cause, may be the product of causes whose 
complexity cannot be brought into even rough correspondence 
with the simple elements of a present-day psychological explana-
tion. (1970, 399) (Italics added) 
 I can reasonably say that Nagel’s objections are not directed against 
scientific materialism but against folk materialism. He says that the solution 
lies in “a more advanced theory of human functioning” as follows: 
If that is so, then a physicalist theory of human functioning will 
not take the form of identifications between old-style psycholog-
ical states and microscopically described physical states of the 
central nervous system. It will be couched instead in the concepts 
of a more advanced theory of human higher functioning. (1970, 
399) (Italics added.) 
 Old psychological concepts will not work in the future. They will become 
archaic. In a future theory of cognition, we will need novel mental terms 
and a new objective phenomenological vocabulary.  
 I hope that this is a sufficient introduction to Nagel’s ideas about phys-
icalism, objectivity, and folk psychology. Now let us see which and in what 
ways philosophers misconceived his position about consciousness. 
3. How is Nagel misconceived? 
 Thomas Nagel is probably one of the most-cited living analytic philoso-
phers of the second half of the last century and arguably the most-cited 
philosopher of mind ever.5 His arguments are often cited as refuting some 
or all versions of physicalist theories (Lycan 2003, 186; Avramides 2006, 
228–30; Wider 1990; Gorman 2006; Taylor 2016, 78; Thomas 2009, 35), as 
denying the possibility of giving a naturalistic/objective account of con-
sciousness (Flanagan 1985, 373; Ratcliffe 2002, 353; Bergström 2009, 76; 
Stoljar 2017, sec. 16), or as showing that the arguments in favor of  
                                                 
5  For his 1974 paper, Web of Science (WoS) citations (as of June 17, 2020): 2,501 
counts, from Clarivate. 
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physicalism are not cogent (Nagasawa 2003, 377). The only two works (in 
either one of the sections of the respective books) that have somewhat fo-
cused on the connection between Nagel’s physicalism and his objective phe-
nomenology are (Stubenberg 1998; Thomas 2009). Although Stubenberg 
argues that the objective phenomenology project is to clear the path for 
future physicalism (p. 42), Thomas argues that Nagel’s nonphysicalism is 
compatible with his objectivism (p. 38).6 None of these accounts adequately 
addresses the relationship between physicalism, objectivity, and massive 
deficiencies of folk psychology, as Nagel construes them.  
 Nagel is largely a critical defender of objectivism (see Nagel 1986, 5; Nagel 
1974, 449; for a defense of not objectivity but the scientific explanation of 
mental, see Nagel 2013). If objectivity is naturally associated with the third-
person externalist viewpoint, subjectivity is associated with the first-person 
internal viewpoint. An objective point of view is “a progressive departure 
from earlier internal views” or subjective view (Boruah 1995, 339). They are 
not contrasting viewpoints, but “are part of a single spectrum of vision” 
(1995, 339). These two views are not mutually exclusive. This is why Nagel 
talks about “mental objectivity” (1986, chap. 2). Before discussing the rela-
tionship between his physicalism and the project of objective phenomenology, 
we should take a closer look at his conception of physicalism. 
 Nagel’s earliest definition of physicalism is “I mean by physicalism the 
thesis that a person, with all his psychological attributes, is nothing over 
and above his body, with all its physical attribute” (1965, 339). He is “in-
clined to believe that some weak physicalist theory of the third type is true” 
and that “any plausible physicalism will include some state and event iden-
tities, both particular and general” (p. 340). The first type is identity the-
ory, and the fourth is something even weaker than the token physicalism.7 
His acknowledging the truth of physicalism is abductive. He has some  
reasons to believe that some sort of physicalism should be true. He gives no 
                                                 
6  Alan Thomas tends to interpret Nagel’s objective phenomenology project in an 
expressly anti-physicalist manner. The problem is that he does not provide an argu-
ment for this and just assumes it. 
7  We should not be perplexed by the labyrinthine complexities of the concept of 
the physical and of theories of physicalism. These are extraneous to my present 
discussion. 
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argument for this. In fact, his problem is not to defend or refute physicalism 
but just to defeat the then widespread arguments for the conclusion that 
physicalism must be false. 
My attitude toward it is precisely the reverse of my attitude to-
ward physicalism, which repels me although I am persuaded of 
its truth. The two are of course related, since what bothers me 
about physicalism is the thought that I cannot be a mere physical 
object, cannot in fact be anything in the world at all, and that 
my sensations and so forth cannot be simply the attributes of 
some substance. (1965, 356, cf. 1971, 111) (All but the last italics 
have been added) 
 Interestingly, from this passage, we see that Nagel has been a physicalist 
in as early as 1965; he was persuaded of its truth.8 Crane claims that the 
point for Nagel is that we cannot fully understand physicalism. However, this 
interpretation of Crane is problematic because Nagel does not say that “we 
cannot understand it ever.” He does not claim that a physicalist account of 
consciousness cannot be given, only claims that nobody has yet given a plau-
sible account. Thus, there remains a conceptual barrier in front of us.  
 What Nagel says is that when assuming the available mentalistic con-
ception of human beings, the identity of mind and brain appears impossible 
to be true. On the other hand, he explicitly acknowledges that some weak 
form of physicalism is true. The reasonable conclusion thus is that we should 
revise and expand upon our available set of mentalistic ideas. This is why 
claiming that Nagel argues for the strict irreducibility of the mental to the 
physical is in erroneous. Nagel has only argued for conditional conceptual 
irreducibility given our self-conception, not for categorical irreducibility. 
Concepts reform, and categorical irreducibility disappears. The unintelligi-
bility of the physicalist account of experience then ends.  
 In his atypical form of physicalism, the classical distinction between 
physical and mental becomes obsolete. The subjective-objective relationship 
                                                 
8  In conversation, many people asked me how I happened to be sure that Nagel 
did not substantially change his attitude toward physicalism in the last half a cen-
tury. The answer to that question lies in my exposition of his replacement of the 
physicalism question with the problem of objectivity. 
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replaces the mental–physical dichotomy (Nagel 1979, 202). However, the 
notion of objectivity is importantly revised in stages as follows: “The devel-
opment goes in stages, each of which gives a more objective picture than 
the one before” (1980, 79). If we can see that the question of physicalism is 
the problem of objectivity in guise, we can accept that the physicalism 
problem is not an ontological but a methodological one. This is so since 
“[O]bjectivity is a method of understanding” (1980, 77). The categories of 
subjectivity and objectivity replaces the categories of mental and physical. 
I think that this is key to understanding why Nagel occasionally refers to 
his approach as neutral monism or dual-aspect theory. 
4. The problem of physicalism lies in giving  
an objective account of the subjective 
“… the physical is a substitute for objectivity in posing  
the mind-body problem.” (Nagel 1979, 202) 
 Pär Sundström notes that many people reject the reading of Nagel 1974 
to the effect that consciousness cannot be explained in physicalist terms: 
In conversation, I have often met with the claim that Nagel does 
not try to argue that experience cannot be accounted for in phys-
icalist terms, but merely illustrates an intuition. I think there is 
something true about this. (2002, 92) 
 Nagel asserts that “The mind-body problem exists because we naturally 
want to include the mental life of conscious organisms in a comprehensive 
scientific understanding of the world” (1993, 1). He “offers a defense and a 
critique of objectivity” (1986, 5).9 For Nagel, the core problem lies in how 
to give an ever increasingly objective account of the subjective.10  
                                                 
9  His critique of objectivism is limited to some ambitious claims of some natural 
scientists who venture fall beyond the scientific spirit and make bold assertions 
bolstered by a metaphysical worldview (Nagel, 2012, ch. 1). For him, those who 
choose anti-reductionism over objectivity deserve neither. 
10  By far, the most elaborate version of his objective phenomenology project is 
presented in his The View from Nowhere (1986, chap. II). This does not determine 
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 For Nagel, if something is physical, “it has to be objective” (1974, 449, 
fn 15, for more on this issue see also 1979, 202). That is, if we are to explain 
the mental in physical terms, we have to characterize it as something ob-
jective. On the other hand, what we need might be mental objectivity (1986, 
17). Nonetheless, Nagel anticipates that in the future when relationships 
between the mental and physical are fully understood, “the fundamental 
terms” of the theory that explains that relation will not fall squarely with 
our current categories of physical or mental. That is, for Nagel, the physical 
account of the mental will remain improbable without “giving much more 
thoughts” to the general problem of the subjective and objective (1974, 
450). In fact, Nagel, in one of his less known works, states that the problem 
of physicalism is just a substitute for the question of objectivity (1979, 202; 
for a parallel claim, see Stoljar 2017) as follows: 
The physical is an ideal representative for the objective in gen-
eral; therefore much obscurity has been shed on the problem by 
faulty analogies between the mental–physical relation and rela-
tions between the physical and other objective aspects of reality.  
Nagel explores the connection between the physical and the objective. Hav-
ing a more objective/detached account of consciousness is his desire (1980, 
91) because “objectivity is naturally linked with reality” (1979, 202). If the 
internality of our psychology (i.e., the subjectivity of consciousness) is real, 
then there must be an objective account of it. Several central philosophical 
problems in the philosophy of mind are in fact the disguised expressions of 
the objectivity problem as described below.  
As determinism is a substitute for externality or objectivity in 
posing the problem of free will, so the physical is a substitute for 
objectivity in posing the mind-body problem. All the disputes 
over causal role, theoretical identification, and functional realiza-
tion, while of interest in themselves, fail to give expression to the 
central issue that makes the mind-body problem so hard. (Nagel 
1979, 202) 
                                                 
whether the objective account of the subjective aspect of experience can be absolute 
or complete and whether it is desirable to achieve it maximally (Thomas 2009, 33). 
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 What makes the problem of consciousness intractable, thus, is not that 
there is a mystery about how the physical gives rise to the mental but our 
lack of a suitable notion of objectivity. Our current notion of objectivity is 
confined to pure physical objectivity. It pushes the phenomenal aspect of 
experience out to the purely subjective side of the debate. The phenomeno-
logical aspect of experience should be made amenable to objective explora-
tion. Nagel proposes doing this through his objective phenomenology pro-
ject. The target of this project is “to clear the path for a future physicalism” 
(Stubenberg 1998, 42; also see Matthews 2009, 71). This is indeed the case: 
Apart from its own interest, a phenomenology that is in this sense 
objective may permit questions about the physical basis of expe-
rience to assume a more intelligible form. Aspects of subjective 
experience that admitted this kind of objective description might 
be better candidates for objective explanations of a more familiar 
sort. (Nagel 1974, 449–50) 
 This is Nagel’s guess. In the future, it is possible to develop an objec-
tive phenomenological vocabulary to answer the question: “what is it like 
to be a bat for a bat?” (see Atkins 2013). Nagel does not deny the possi-
bility of giving an objective account of consciousness. In contrast, he 
strives for this. 
5. Concluding remarks 
 Finally, I must state that most of the things that philosophers say about 
Nagel have no basis at all in what Nagel actually says about the possibility 
of giving an objective account of the subjective aspect of experience. 
Thomas Nagel is not against physicalism as such, but he is against some 
mistaken forms of it. Nagel acknowledges the truth of weaker forms of phys-
icalism. He does not deny the power of scientific achievements or objective 
methodology in the examination of philosophical problems, even including 
the subjective aspect of experience. He is not a subjectivist. Quite the re-
verse, he claims that we should pursue an unending inquiry to find the 
objective nature of subjective phenomena. The project of objective phenom-
enology is proposed for this aim. Nagel has shown us a way to conceive the 
14  Serdal Tümkaya 
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consciousness problem in an objective manner. Consciousness is something 
intractable, yet it can be made tractable in a physicalist framework through 
an objective phenomenology project. It is fallacious to demand a direct an-
swer to such a complex problem as consciousness without first analyzing 
the basis of the question itself. This is what Nagel did. He challenged the 
widespread assumption that the problem of consciousness is intractable by 
its very nature. 
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